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The average consumer in the Norwegian mobile subscription market could save around 
NOK 1 200 per annum or more by switching, but each year approximately only 1 in 3 do so. 
Moreover, the firms providing the most expensive subscriptions have a remarkable high market 
share compared to the relatively cheaper mobile subscription suppliers. The apparent reluctance 
to switch away from expensive contracts could allow firms to exploit locked-in customers. 
Following the insights from behavioural economics this thesis introduces different types 
of consumers to a model of competition and switching cost. The model predicts what an 
incumbent firm’s strategy is in a market with consumes who exhibit either time-consistent or -
inconsistent preferences. The main finding is that even low switching cost can deter naïve 
consumers’ propensity to switch. Therefore, it is easy for an incumbent firm to set a high market 
price without losing much of its market share.  
Additionally, some partial evidence for the predictions are found by looking at the 
mobile subscription market. The evidence is based on data collected from Nkom, the mobile 
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Markets are often characterized with substantial costs of switching between different 
brands of nearly identical products, and the implications of these costs on consumer welfare 
has been widely discussed. Switching costs relate to the costs, both real and fictious, of either 
switching to a new provider or cancelling the agreement (Wilkinson and Klaes, 2018). One of 
the most acknowledged conjectures of the implications of switching cost is given by Paul 
Klemperer. Klemperer (1995) states: “[…] consumer switching costs give firms a degree of 
market power over their repeat-purchasers, and mean that firms’ current market shares are 
important determinants of their future profits.”. In microeconomic literature, switching costs 
are thought of as being substantial in many markets and to have a considerable impact on 
strategic moves.  
Regarding the potential importance of switching costs, Porter (1980) states: “[…] the 
impact of all strategic moves on switching costs should be considered”. The justification for 
considering the impact of switching cost is that any strategic move which hinder consumers’ 
ability to switch, could potentially decrease consumer’s welfare. This is because consumers 
play a vital role in the competitive process by having the ability and the willingness to move 
their purchases to the firms where the best deals are available (Hviid, 2013).  
In some markets, consumers seem to switch less frequent than they should, or at least 
less frequently than what would have been most beneficial for them. One example is the 
telecommunication market, where Telenor, Telia, and ice have respectively 47.5 %, 37.2 %, 
and 9.9 % of the total number of private mobile subscriptions in 2019 (Nkom, 2020). Thus, the 
three largest mobile suppliers have 93.5 % of the market demand even though there are many 
mobile subscription suppliers. Additionally, it is surprising that Telenor has the largest share of 
demand since it is the most expensive supplier, with its 20 to 250NOK higher listed prices per 
month compared to its competitors.2  
The National Communications Authority in Norway (Nkom) estimates that 37 % of 
private customers have switched mobile subscription providers in the last two years (Nkom, 
2019), suggesting there is a low switching frequency in the mobile market. When asked if 
switching mobile suppliers is difficult, consumers say they perceive it to be easy even if they 
 







have never switched before.3 Given the relatively low switching frequency and the perception 
that switching is easily done, there is evidence to claim that the mobile market has in fact low 
switching costs.  
The observations from the telecommunication market suggests that substantial 
switching costs might not provide a sufficiently explanation behind the expensive firms’ ability 
to maintain a high market share over time. The effective effort needed for switching providers 
appears not that high, yet many consumers choose to stay at the most expensive suppliers of 
mobile subscription. This contrasts with the established models building on rational consumers 
and which requires switching costs to be very high for a firm to manage to sustain higher prices 
and share of customers over a long time-horizon.  
Another part of the economic literature, specifically the behavioural economics 
literature, points out how anomalies can be explained by adding psychological aspects to 
economic models (Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2018). Behavioural economics suggest that self-
control problems is a new type of market failure stemming from the fact that consumers have 
cognitive limitations and psychological biases where they, among other things, do not learn 
from their previous mistakes. Combining the behavioural insights to theory used in economics 
is thought to increase the explanatory power of economic theories since it often provides it with 
more realistic psychological foundations (Wilkinson and Klaes, 2018). In this thesis, different 
consumer types are added to the competition model with switching cost, thereby providing an 
explanation for why customers seem to switch less frequently than they should (given the very 
low physical switching costs). The explanation originates from the perception that people are 
likely to procrastinate and postpone activities with even small switching costs, because of an 
over-optimism concerning future self-discipline. This will be modelled using hyperbolic time-
discounting combined with naïveté in a simple framework.  
The hypothesis of this thesis is that low switching costs can create high prices (to 
specific consumer types) and sustained market shares for an incumbent firm who faces 
competition from a competitive fringe. Previous literature which combines consumer types with 
switching costs has argued that naïveté gives firms incentives to increase switching costs.4 
However, in this thesis, even very small switching costs is deterring. 
 
3 Result from a survey performed in the practice-based course at the Institute for Economics at the 
University of Bergen in 2018, see Figure 5.17.  
4 Notable, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), only addressed partial naïveté. However, it is argued that 





The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 existing articles about 
switching cost are presented. In Chapter  3 the behavioural insights are presented, where the 
standard model is introduced in Subsection 3.1, and the 𝛽𝛿-model is introduced in Subsection 
3.2. In Chapter 4 a simple model with switching cost is presented, starting with an illustration 
of the implications of switching cost for different consumer types in Subsection 4.1, followed 
by the presentation of the model of competition with switching cost in Subsection 4.2. In 
Chapter 5, the predictions of the model are compared with the Norwegian mobile market. 
Chapter 6 is the discussion part of the thesis, where Subsection 6.1 discuss the implications of 








2.1 SWITCHING COSTS 
Switching costs are potential real and/or fictious costs associated with the process of 
switching between different products, brands, service suppliers, etc., for a consumer. Klemperer 
(1995) divides switching costs into four categories and separates them into unavoidable costs 
and costs that can be a product of firm strategy. The four categories of switching costs are 
physical, informational, artificial, and/or psychological switching costs. The physical 
transaction cost of switching, and the psychological cost connected to brand-loyalty are 
examples of unavoidable costs. The comparability between competing products (physical cost), 
the information needed to use a brand or the quality of it (informational costs), and rewards 
connected to repeated use of a product through discount coupons, loyalty programs, etc. 
(artificial costs), are examples of switching costs that can be manipulated by firms.  
Switching cost is, and has been a highly popular topic for economic articles since the 
1980s (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). In May 2020, there existed 1 586 records with the topic 
Switching cost in the category economics at the Web of Science archive. Figure 2.1 shows the 
trend of the amount published articles. In the remaining part of chapter 2.1, a small selection of 
the most acknowledged articles about switching costs and their main findings are summarized.  
 
2.1.1 Klemperer (1987, 1995)  
Klemperer wrote about switching costs in his PhD thesis, and is currently among those 
who has written the most papers within the topic. A shortened version of one the chapters from 
















































































































































Number of publications with the topic switching cost
(Web of Science)
2 Literature Review 
Figure 2.1: Records of publications with the topic "switching cost" in the category “economics” at Web of Science (May 





explaining the corporate strategy connected to the goal of a large market share, and he makes 
two points about markets with switching costs. Firstly, switching costs make the firm’s demand 
more inelastic, leading to reduced rivalry. Secondly, the gained monopoly power for firms over 
their respective customer type leads to vigorous competition for market share before consumers 
have attached themselves to any supplier (Klemperer, 1987). 
The model by Klemperer (1987) shows how there might be hard competition for market 
share in the early stages of a market’s development because of the prospects of larger profits in 
the future. The prospects of larger profits in the future is due to the resulting monopoly rents 
from the locked-in customers because of the switching costs in a mature market. Klemperer 
also mentions that due to reduced consumer welfare, any monopoly gains might be reduced 
through regulatory policies. Thus, switching costs have also the potential to make firms worse 
off than in a standard oligopoly.  
In Klemperer’s 1995 article, he reviews recent publications on competition in markets 
where consumers have costs of switching between competing firm’s products. He examines 
how firms’ incentives for either setting a low price to capture market share or setting a high 
price to harvest profits by exploiting the firms’ current locked-in customers changes as different 
factors and expectations alters. Klemperer (1995) concludes that switching costs generally raise 
prices and create deadweight losses identical to those under a closed oligopoly. Additionally, 
since switching costs often reduces competition, firms might waste even more social surplus in 
costly activities to increase the switching costs.  
2.1.2 Farrell and Shapiro (1988) 
Farrell and Shapiro (1988) presents an analysis of consumer switching costs in an 
overlapping-generations model of duopolistic competition. They separate between established 
and uncommitted buyers, where it is assumed that one firm serves all the attached customers 
while its rival serves the new customers. They further assume firms cannot discriminate 
between the different customers.  
Under their model, switching costs encourage entries of new firms, even when entry is 
inefficient. Farrell and Shapiro state that, when looking at economies of scale, incumbent firms 
could exclude rivals due to cost advantages while still making positive economic profits.5  
However, the incumbent has also incentives to exploit its committed buyers, letting newly 
 
5 Farrell and Shapiro’s results of pro-entry tendencies are also persistent under moderate economies of 





established firms serve the new customers. Thus, switching costs will most often tend to 
promote entry of new firms because incumbent firms choose the fat-cat strategy. 
They further find that under great economies of scale, there would be no entry in 
equilibrium. Entry for a new firm would be unattractive since it could not compete for the 
attached buyers due to their switching costs. Furthermore, the incumbent would not have 
incentives to set a price which encourages new firms to enter the market, because it would 
harden the competition if the incumbent set a favourable price for new entrants.   
2.1.3 Beggs and Klemperer (1992) 
Beggs and Klemperer (1992) study an infinite-period market with consumer switching 
costs, where they analyse the evolution of duopolies’ prices and market shares as new 
consumers arrive and a fraction of old consumers leave every period. Their model shows that 
prices rise as firms discount the future more, and prices will fall if consumers discount the future 
more heavily, if the turnover of consumers increases, or if the rate of growth of the market 
increases. 
Beggs and Klemperer states that switching costs give consumers incentives to purchase 
from the same firm as he/she previously bought from, even if a competing firm is selling a 
functionally identical product. They also find that the prices offered in markets with switching 
costs exceeds the prices offered in markets without switching costs. Furthermore, the higher 
profits (because of the switching costs) attracts new entries, even though the new firms must 
overcome the disadvantage of locked-in customers at existing firms.  
2.1.4 Chen (1997) 
Chen (1997) studies the implications of offering discounts to new customers in markets 
with switching costs in a two-period duopoly model for a homogeneous good. He finds that “in 
equilibrium, firms will offer the same prices and discounts in a mature market even if they have 
different market shares and the demands faced by these firms in a new market become more 
elastic” (Chen, 1997). In likeness to Farrell and Shapiro, he believes firms can charge different 
prices to existing and new customers, and further defend the statement by saying switching 
costs will naturally separate those customer types. He does examine regimes where all 
customers must be treated equally as well.  
2.1.5 DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) 
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) analyse how rational firms respond to consumer 





timing of rewards and payments, thus showing the implications of consumer types for contract 
design. The implications are different for investment goods (goods that have immediate 
physical and/or psychological costs) and leisure goods (goods with immediate benefits and 
delayed costs). They show that even if there is perfect competition, naïve consumers will not 
be able to maximize their welfare. Their findings for (partially) naïve consumers are put down 
to three points, and they will be summarized in the following paragraphs. 
Firstly, firms have incentives to price investment goods below marginal cost. This is 
because naïve consumers tend to overestimate their usage of such goods and would therefore 
overestimate the value of the discount on marginal cost. Sophisticates on the other hand, will 
use the cost as a form of commitment. DellaVigna and Malmendier use the health club industry 
as evidence for this prediction since other theories like price discrimination cannot be used to 
describe that industry’s practice (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006).  
Secondly, firms price leisure goods above marginal costs because naïfs underestimate 
their future usage. DellaVigna and Malmendier states this prediction is present in the credit card 
financing, where naïve consumers are attracted by offers which have favourable initial terms. 
Evidence for this prediction was also found in the mobile subscription industry, where they set 
a low price for the subscriptions and a high price for usage that exceeds what is included. Naïfs 
underestimates how much they will use these goods and may therefore end up paying way more 
than expected for their monthly bills.  
Lastly, for all types of goods, firms will have incentives to introduce switching costs. 
DellaVigna and Malmendier write it is common for credit card companies to have introductory 
or “teaser” offers for limited periods. If there is a cost for ending the relationship with the 
provider or switching to another, some users will remain members longer than they would have 
otherwise. Naïve consumers will for example underestimate the amount of their borrowing after 
the teaser period is over in the credit card financing. Firms would therefore find it 
advantageously (strictly prefer) to induce switching costs on naïfs since they underestimate 
their renewal probability of their contracts: “… if the firm could charge infinitely high switching 
cost, it could in principle extract an infinite amount of surplus from the consumer [if the 
consumers are partially naïve]” (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004). 
DellaVigna and Malmendier argue that market interactions might not reduce 
sophisticated consumers’ welfare. Sophisticates might gain if they are in effect being subsidized 
by naïve consumers, which might be the case with credit card financing. Furthermore, due to 





sophisticated consumers to increase their long-run welfare. This is present when consumers  
e.g., invests in life insurance policies.  
For naïve consumers, who have non-rational expectations, DellaVigna and Malmendier 
note two adverse welfare effects. Firstly, there will be an overall reduction in efficiency in terms 
of net surplus to consumers and producers. Secondly, in monopoly, there will be a redistribution 
of surplus from consumers to producers since producers are able to take advantage of the self-
control problems to increase their profits. Lastly, they note that these two adverse effects on the 
welfare of naïve consumers will also have implications for government policy. 
2.1.6 Farrell and Klemperer (2007) 
Farrell and Klemperer (2007) write a literature review about the implications of 
switching costs. They underline that the implications of switching costs are dynamic: 
“Switching costs shift competition away from what we normally think of as the default (a single 
consumer’s needs in a single period) to something broader – a single consumer’s needs over 
time” (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). The dynamic implication of switching costs comes from 
the fact that “large switching costs lock in a buyer once he makes an initial purchase, so he is 
effectively buying a series of goods, just as (more generally) with strong enough relationship-
specific economies of scope, sellers compete on bundles of goods rather than single goods” 
(Farrell and Klemperer, 2007).  
Furthermore, when looking at markets where a dominant firm set prices and competitive 
firms are price-takers, the dominant firm will exploit its locked-in customers:  
“If incumbents must set a single price to old and new buyers, a firm with 
a larger customer base puts relatively more weight on harvesting this base than 
on winning new customers. Thus switching costs create a fat-cat effect that 
actually encourages entry that focuses purely on new customers, and makes 
competition stable: large shares tend to shrink and small to grow.” – (Farrell 





Economic theory often assumes consumers (and firms) to behave rationally. Consumers 
maximizing their future utility will sometimes devote less importance to utility attained in later 
periods. This is captured by adding a discount factor (𝛿𝑡) to the utility function, where 𝛿 ∈
(0,1]. 6 The value of the discount factor is determined by how the consumer values future 
outcomes, i.e., how much he/she cares about attained future utility, in addition to factors that 
diminish the expected utility generated by a future outcome, e.g., uncertainty or changing tastes 
(Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue 2002). If the consumer values future outcomes less 
than the current outcome, the discount factor will be less than 1, creating an exponential form 
for the attained utility over time. Utility maximizing with the discount factor 𝛿 will henceforth 
be called the standard model. The standard model will here be the rational case for consumer 
maximization of current and future utility. 
The assumption of time-consistent preferences is a rather strong assumption, and 
inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization has been analysed since 1955 (Strotz, 1955). 
Findings on self-control problems challenges the assumption that the discount factor is time-
consistent (DellaVigna, 2009). This chapter will therefore present the 𝛽𝛿-model which exhibit 
intertemporal preferences and thus time-inconsistent discounting of the future utility stream. 
Time-preferences refers to the preference for immediate utility over delayed utility (Frederick 
et al., 2002).  
The 𝛽𝛿-model was first developed by Phelps and Pollak (1968), and has later been 
employed by several economists. Although this model was developed in 1968, the economic 
implications were not greatly discussed prior to the last 20 years, as shown in Figure 3.1. The 
standard model and the 𝛽𝛿-model presented here, is formalized by O'Donoghue and Rabin 
(1999). 
 
6 The discount factor could be equal to 0, meaning the consumer only cares about the utility attained in 
the current period (myopic case). Nevertheless, since it is a rather strong assumption and would invalidate the 
notation (𝛿𝑡), it will be assumed the discount factor is larger than 0 in this thesis. In the current period, the discount 
factor is equal to 1 (𝛿0 = 1). 






3.1 STANDARD MODEL 
The standard model exhibit time-consistency for consumers’ preferences. This implies 
the discount factor between any two consecutive time periods is independent of the time-period 
the utility is evaluated (DellaVigna 2009). In other words, consumers behaviour is time-
consistent since what they perceive is the best future reaction, will also be the best reaction in 
the future. 
The standard model presented here is the version denoted by O'Donoghue and Rabin 
(1999). It is a simple standard model used by economists which denotes the present and future 
stream of utility for a consumer:7 For all 𝑡, 




 (1)  
𝑈𝑡 represents the consumer’s time preferences viewed from period 𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡 denotes the 
consumer’s utility in period 𝑡. The future stream of utility is discounted by the factor 𝛿 ∈ (0,1], 
indicating the future utility is less important compared to the present because people are 
impatient (while still ensuring the standard model exhibit time-consistent preferences).8  
3.2 𝛽𝛿-MODEL 
Time preferences, and thereof intertemporal preferences, is central for the self-control 
problems presented in the 𝛽𝛿-model. Intertemporal preferences capture the fact that when 
people are evaluating outcomes in the distant future, they are patient and make plans. However, 
 
7 The future stream of utility could also be denoted as a definite stream (𝑇). However, since the model 
derived under chapter 4 is of an indefinite time-period, an infinity stream of utility is denoted here.  
8 O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) does not concern themselves with budget constraints, because they focus 
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Figure 3.1: Records of publications with the topic "myopia", “hyperbolic discounting”, and “self-control problems” in the 
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when the future gets near, the discounting gets steep and they become impatient and change 
their plans (DellaVigna, 2009). Another denomination for intertemporal preferences, is present 
bias or myopia. To recapitulate, present bias implies that people tend to be more impatient in 
the short run and become more patient over longer periods of time (Wilkinson and Klaes, 2018). 
Present biasedness is manifested in the 𝛽𝛿-model using hyperbolic discounting. 
Hyperbolic discount functions are characterized by a relatively high 
discount rate over short horizons and a relatively low discount rate over long 
horizons. This discount structure sets up a conflict between today’s preferences, 
and the preferences that will be held in the future. – Laibson (1997) 
The primary implication of using hyperbolic discounting in utility maximization is that 
the discount factor between any two consecutive time periods is dependent of the time-period 
the utility is evaluated, thus creating time-inconsistency (Wilkinson and Klaes, 2018). The 
difference between hyperbolic and exponential discounting is illustrated in Figure 3.2.9  
 
Inconsistency between the optimal plan for future behaviour and the executed behaviour 
was first introduced by Strotz (1955). The inconsistency motivated the assumption of a higher 
discount rate between the current period and the next period, thus making the 𝛽𝛿-model an 
attractive solution (Wilkinson and Klaes, 2018). O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) distinct 
between three different consumer types depending on their self-awareness of their time-
inconsistent behaviour, namely rational, sophisticated, and naïve consumers.  
 
9 The figure is based on a model and numbers presented in Wilkinson and Klaes (2018). 





The introduction of the parameter 𝛽  to the standard model will establish present 
biasedness for sophisticates and naïfs. Taking out the first period of the sum operator and adding 
the new 𝛽 component in the standard model, it would now be: for all 𝑡 
 𝑈𝑡(𝑢𝑡+𝑢𝑡+1, 𝑢𝑡+2, … , 𝑢𝑇) ≡ 𝛿




,   where 0 < 𝛽, 𝛿 ≤ 1 (2)  
This is the 𝛽𝛿-model, which also is known as the hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, present 
biased or quasi-geometric model (Wilkinson and Klaes, 2018). If 𝛽 = 1, the 𝛽𝛿-model is the 
same as the standard model, indicating the consumer have time-consistent preferences and 
exhibit exponential discounting. If 𝛽 < 1 people will discount more when comparing present 
and future than when they compare two subsequent future periods, i.e., they are present biased 
and exhibit hyperbolic discounting. This is because between any future period and the next 
period, the discount factor will be 𝛿  (
𝛽𝛿𝑡+1
𝛽𝛿𝑡
= 𝛿), while comparing present and future, the 
discount factor will be 𝛽𝛿 (
𝛽𝛿𝑡+1
𝛿𝑡
= 𝛽𝛿), which is less than 𝛿. To recapitulate, the added 𝛽 
ensures that the discount rates are different from the standard model, and the discount factors  
in the 𝛽𝛿-model is different depending on which consecutive periods one considers.  
The discount function under the  𝛽𝛿-model is (𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽𝛿𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛿𝑡+2 +⋯+ 𝛽𝛿𝑇). The 
point that the discount factor depends on which consecutive period one considers is illustrated 
in Table 3.1. The table shows what the discount factors are under the 𝛽𝛿-model viewed from 
different time-periods.  
Table 3.1: Discount factor between any period and its consecutive. 
 
Discount factor in period 𝒕 











𝑡 𝛿𝑡 𝛽𝛿𝑡+1 𝛽𝛿𝑡+2 𝛽𝛿𝑡+3 𝛽𝛿𝑡+4 ⋯ 𝛽𝛿𝑇 
𝑡 + 1   𝛿𝑡 𝛽𝛿𝑡+1 𝛽𝛿𝑡+2 𝛽𝛿𝑡+3 ⋯ 𝛽𝛿𝑇 
𝑡 + 2    𝛿𝑡 𝛽𝛿𝑡+1 𝛽𝛿𝑡+2 ⋯ 𝛽𝛿𝑇 
𝑡 + 3    𝛿𝑡 𝛽𝛿𝑡+1 ⋯ 𝛽𝛿𝑇 
𝑡 + 4     𝛿𝑡 ⋯ 𝛽𝛿𝑇 
⋮      ⋱ ⋮ 





3.2.1 Perception-perfect strategies 
When analysing the 𝛽𝛿-model, it is important to understand people’s beliefs about their 
future time inconsistency. For those with time inconsistent behaviour, they will discount 
according to 1 + 𝛽𝛿 + 𝛽𝛿2 +⋯  today, and tomorrow and onwards they believe they will 
discount according to 1 + ?̂?𝛿 + ?̂?𝛿2 +⋯, where ?̂? ≥ 𝛽. ?̂? denotes the presumed degree of 
present biasedness, while 𝛽 denotes the true degree of present biasedness (DellaVigna, 2009). 
The closer ?̂? is to 𝛽, the more self-aware is the person. The degree of self-awareness of the 
present biasedness can affect behaviour differently. Consumers who are aware of their present 
biasedness might utilise commitment devices (Strotz, 1955), while those who are unaware or 
ignores their present biasedness overestimates or underestimates their ability of performing the 
given activity.  
O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) defines a perception-perfect strategy as a strategy that in 
all periods (including periods after the activity is performed) a person chooses the optimal 
action given his/her current preferences and his/her perceptions of future behaviour.  
3.2.1.1 Time-Consistent Consumers  
Time-consistent preferences implies that the consumers exhibit correct estimation of 
their propensity to switch. Time-consistent consumers, henceforth TCs,10 exhibits exponential 
discounting of future utility. The time-consistent case of consumers could also be captured in 
the 𝛽𝛿-model by setting 𝛽 = 1, since this would reduce the 𝛽𝛿-model to the standard model. 
The perception-perfect strategy for TCs as defined by O’Donoghue and Rabin is: 
Reflecting the fact that TCs do not have a self-control problem, […] in 
any period, TCs will complete the activity if and only if it is the optimal period 
of those remaining given her preferences. 
– O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) 
3.2.1.2 Sophisticated Consumers 
Sophisticated consumers foresee their future self-control problems. Since 𝛽 is less than 
1, sophisticated people will exhibit hyperbolic discounting of future utility. The sophisticates 
are captured in the 𝛽𝛿 -model by setting 𝛽 = ?̂? < 1 . The perception-perfect strategy for 
sophisticates as defined by O’Donoghue and Rabin is: 
 





[…] sophisticates know they will have self-control problems in the 
future, and therefore correctly predict future behaviour. […] in period 𝑡 , 
sophisticates calculate when their future selves will complete the activity if they 
wait now, and then do the activity if and only if given their current preferences 
doing it now is preferred to waiting for their future selves to do it.  
– O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) 
3.2.1.3 Naïve consumers 
Naïve people do not foresee their self-control problems. Implying they are unaware of 
their self-control problems. Naïve consumers exhibit hyperbolic discounting of future utility. 
However, they believe they exhibit  exponential discounting (or at least less hyperbolic 
discounting than their true value). It is therefore the perceptions of future preferences which 
separates naïve and sophisticated people. The naïfs are captured in the 𝛽𝛿-model by setting 
𝛽 < ?̂? ≤ 1. The perception-perfect strategy for naïfs as defined by O’Donoghue and Rabin is:  
Naïfs have present-biased preferences (since 𝛽 < 1), but naïfs believe 
that they are time-consistent. As a result, the decision process for naïfs is 
identical to that for TCs (although naïfs have different preferences). […] in any 
period, naïfs will complete the activity if and only if it is the optimal period of 
those remaining given her current preferences.  






The model derived in this chapter is meant to illustrate the implications of switching 
cost for different consumer types. The foundations of the derived model are constructed by the 
supervisors. The simplest way to showcase the hypothesis of the thesis, is to only include the 
most necessary parameters and to have infinite time-periods. Only five parameters were chosen 
for this model, namely a discount factor, a present biasedness parameter, a consumer surplus 
parameter for each firm, and a switching cost. Although this model illustrates a rather extreme 
situation, it presents an explanation for the noted switching cost puzzle in a simple way.  
The model derived in this chapter, assumes the incumbent firm has previously covered 
the market demand and consumers must now choose between staying a customer to the 
incumbent firm or switching to a new firm. This setting would be applicable to, e.g., markets 
which previously have been regulated by patents or under state-ownership, and which later 
respectively are unprotected or privatized. Examples of such incumbent firms could be any 
pharmaceutical company, Telenor, and SAS.  
The main finding given in the model is that even low switching costs will decrease the 
switching frequency for time-inconsistent consumer (especially for naïve consumers due to 
their procrastination). Furthermore, the model predicts that firms will have incentives to 
increase their prices because of the self-control problems for the time-inconsistent consumers, 
which consequently would decrease their consumers surplus.  
4.1 CONSUMER OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM 
I will first look at the implications of switching costs for consumer behaviour. The 
consumers are either time-consistent discounters, or sophisticated or naïve hyperbolic 
discounters. Firm’s strategies will currently be ignored, i.e., firm’s strategies are assumed to be 
exogeneous under Chapter 4.1. This implies that we only look at the demand side and keep 
everything on the supply side as given, which makes it easier to see the propensity of switching 
for the different consumer types.  
This part of the model is an application of O’Donoghue and Rabin’s (1999) model, with 
the difference that we look at infinite time-periods and do not restrict the consumers to perform 
the activity at least once.  
In the model it will be assumed that consumers can be divided into three different types 






preferences of future utility. The three consumer types are time-consistent (𝑇𝐶), sophisticated 
(𝑆), and (fully) naïve (𝑁) consumers. The consumer types have different reasoning behind the 
calculations of the trade-off of the completion of the activity, and it is their perceptions of the 
future that drives the solution for the switching cost puzzle. The optimal solutions are found for 
each of the types separately and then compared.   
We do not concern ourselves of budget constraint, so we abstract from income effects. 
It is thus assumed that consumers simply maximize their stream of consumer surplus over time. 
For any reason, the consumer would attain a higher consumer surplus by purchasing from the 
new firm. The consumers decide their optimal plan of whether to switch in the current period. 
Following the perception-perfect strategies as described in Chapter 3, all the consumer types 
makes an “optimal plan” in the current period. The difference between the consumer types is 
their projection of the optimal plan. The strategy in each period is optimal in that period 
according to the consumers’ perception. Sophisticates and TCs trade-off between staying 
forever or switch today, while naïfs trade-off between switching today or switching tomorrow. 
The reasoning behind those trade-offs are presented in the subsequent subsections.  
To further simplify the expressions, it is assumed that the all the parameters in the 
function are constant over time. Meaning that, e.g., consumers do not change their expectation 
of their future consumer surplus. Consequently, each period would look the same since the 
consumers have no changes in their expectations.  
Consumers’ surplus from consuming are denoted 𝑣𝑖  and 𝑣𝑗  for respectively surplus 
attained at the incumbent firm and the new firm. It is assumed that the obtained consumer 
surplus is largest at the new firm due to some feature(s), like e.g. a lower price or better quality. 
The utility equations consist of five possible parameters; the discount factor (𝛿), the degree of 
present biasedness (𝛽), the consumer surpluses (𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗) and the switching cost (𝑠). 
4.1.1 TCs 
TCs provides the standard case of consumer optimization with their exponential 
discounting of future utility. Thus, illustrating how consumer most often are constructed in 
economic models. TCs perception-perfect strategy is to complete the activity in the given period 
if and only if it is the optimal period of those remaining given his/her preferences. This implies 
that they would either switch in the first period or never, i.e., TCs know they will never switch 
















𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟




𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ
 (3)  
As previously pointed out, the utility attained from switching in the first period must 
exceed the utility from staying all the periods for a consumer to find it desirable to switch at all. 








 (4)  
The parameter of interest in this equation is the switching cost. It is possible to find the 
threshold value for the switching cost to not deter switching. By simplifying the equation with 
respect to 𝑠 and following the rule for the sum of an infinite geometric series, the switching cost 
threshold for TCs is:11 
 𝑠𝑇𝐶
∗ < (𝑣𝑗 − 𝑣𝑖)
1
1 − 𝛿
 (5)  
The equation states that a switching cost exceeding the expression to the right of the 
inequality sign would deter switching for TCs. The higher the gain in consumer surplus from 
switching and/or the more patient the consumer is, the higher is the critical switching cost that 
deter switching.  
4.1.2 Sophisticates 
Because of sophisticates’ time-inconsistency, their optimal plan could be to switch in 
the consecutive period. However, if that is in fact the optimal plan, the sophisticated consumer 
knows that in the consecutive period, the optimal decision would be to delay the switching one 
more period. This is because in the consecutive period, the optimal plan would once again be 
to delay the decision one more period. The sophisticated consumer knows this would go on 
indefinitely, so there would only be one logical choice in the current period: switch now or 
accept that switching will never occur. Thus, sophisticates have the same plan as TCs, where 
they either switch in the current period or never switch. To summarize, since sophisticates are 
 





aware of their own self-control problems, they know that if they do not find it favourable to 
switch in the current period, they would neither find it desirable to switch in any later.  
Sophisticates possible attained utilities are either staying forever or switching in the 










𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟




𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ
 (6)  
In the same way as TCs, sophisticates attained utility from switching in the first period 
must exceed the utility from staying all the periods. The inequality that must hold for this to be 
the case is: 








 (7)  
Following the same approach as under the case of TCs, the switching cost threshold for 
sophisticates is:12 
 𝑠𝑆
∗ < (𝑣𝑗 − 𝑣𝑖) (1 +
𝛽𝛿
1 − 𝛿
) (8)  
Since 0 < 𝛽 < 1 and 0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1, the switching cost threshold for sophisticates will be 
lower than TCs’ threshold. A lower degree of present biasedness (𝛽 → 1), more patience (𝛿 →
1), and a higher consumer surplus gain from switching, would increase the critical switching 
cost which deter switching for sophisticates.  
4.1.3 Naïfs 
Naïve consumers are also time-inconsistent consumers like sophisticated consumers. 
Naïfs would also in the current period ideally plan to switch in the consecutive period because 
of their present biasedness. When the next period arrives, naïfs would once again use the same 
logic, and thus postpone switching again. Because naïfs are unaware of their own self-control 
problems, they believe delaying switching one period would (eventually) result in switching. 
Unlike sophisticates, naïfs believe switching today versus switching tomorrow is a realistic 
plan. Thus, naïfs find it realistic that the choice in the current period is to switch today or switch 
tomorrow. Since naïfs does not think that not switching today implies that they will never 
switch, they anticipate it would be possible to delay the switching one period. Thus, they project 
 





the possible attained utilities to be either switch in the current period or switch in the 










𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑




𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
 (9)  
For a naïve consumer to find switching in the current period preferred to delaying 
switching to the consecutive period, the utility attained from switching in the first period must 
exceed the utility from switching in the next period. Thus, this inequality must hold:  








 (10)  
The switching cost threshold for naïfs is:13<’ 
 𝑠𝑁
∗ < (𝑣𝑗 − 𝑣𝑖)
1
1 − 𝛽𝛿
 (11)  
Since the denominator is higher for the naïfs, the switching cost threshold could be 
considerably less compared to TCs’ and sophisticates’ switching cost threshold.  A lower degree 
of present biasedness (𝛽 → 1), more patience (𝛿 → 1), and a higher consumer surplus gain from 
switching, would increase the critical switching cost which deter switching for naïfs. 
4.1.4 Numerical Example 
A simple example introduces the main idea behind introducing consumer types to 
models with switching costs. Following the setting above, assume the consumers surplus values 
are 𝑣𝑗 = 1 and 𝑣𝑖 =
4
5
, implying a consumer would attain a 25 % higher consumer surplus for 
any reason if he/she switched to firm 𝑗 . Inserting these consumer surplus values into the 





















 (14)  
The subscript indicates that the critical switching cost is for respectively TCs, 
sophisticates and naïfs. These critical switching cost can be found for different values of 𝛽 and 
𝛿. Starting off, 𝛿 is hold constant, while allowing for 𝛽 to be in the interval [0,1]. Figure 4.1 
illustrates how the critical switching cost changes for different discount factors.  
 
 








In the figures, the red line, blue line, and black curve shows the critical switching cost 
for respectively TCs, sophisticates and naïfs. A switching cost above the critical switching cost 
line/curve for the respective consumer type would deter switching. The vertical distance 
between the red and the blue line illustrates that sophisticates prefer current consumption 
relatively higher compared to TCs, who only include their discount of future consumption. The 
vertical distance between the blue and black line illustrates the implications of unawareness of 
the biased preference for current consumption.  
The more patient the consumer is, i.e., the higher 𝛿, the larger is the difference between 
the critical switching cost for the different consumer types and the higher is the critical 
switching cost which deter switching. This can be seen by studying the differences of the y-axis 
for figure a, b c and d in Figure 4.1, which exhibit increasingly higher discount factor. 
The less the consumer prefer current consumption, i.e., the higher 𝛽, the higher is the 
critical switching cost which deter switching. Furthermore, the implications of present bias are 
stronger among naïfs who are unaware of their extent of self-control problems. As the 𝛽 moves 
toward 1, the critical switching cost converges toward the standard case presented by the TCs.   
Next off, 𝛽 is held constant, while allowing for 𝛿 to be in the interval [0,1]. Figure 4.2 
illustrates how the critical switching cost changes for different degrees of present biasedness. 
a)  b) 
c) d) 
Figure 4.1: Critical switching costs with constant 𝛿. Degree of present biasedness on the x-axis, threshold for switching to 
deter switching on the y-axis. The figures depict different discount factors: a) 𝛿 =
1
4
, b) 𝛿 =
1
2
, c) 𝛿 =
3
4






   
 
The figure illustrates that there can exist stickiness problems for very low switching 
costs when consumers are naïve and have a high degree of present biasedness. While TCs’ and 
sophisticates’ critical switching cost eventually grows towards an infinitely high value the more 
patient they are, naïfs have a relatively low critical switching cost (most prevailing in figure b, 
c, and d). Sophisticates do have a bit higher stickiness compared to TCs, however, no matter 
the degree of present biasedness, they eventually get a high critical switching cost.  
In likeness with Figure 5.1, the higher 𝛽 and/or 𝛿, the higher is the critical switching 
cost which deter switching. In other words, the implications of switching costs are larger the 
less patient and/or more present biased the consumer is.   
By considering the discount factor to be 
9
10




the difference between the consumer types and their respective critical switching cost value are 
further illustrated. Inserting these values into equation 12, 13, and 14, we have that: 
𝑠𝑇𝐶
∗ = 2, 𝑠𝑆
∗ = 1.1, 𝑠𝑁
∗ ≈ 0.36 
Models with switching cost often assume consumers to be time-consistent, so one would 
expect that their estimated switching propensities is highly overestimated if consumers exhibit 
c)  
b) a)  
d) 
Figure 4.2: Critical switching costs with constant 𝛽. Discount factor on the x-axis, threshold for switching to deter switching 
on the y-axis. The figures depict different degrees of present biasedness: a) 𝛽 = 0.95, b) 𝛽 =
3
4
, c) 𝛽 =
1
2








time-inconsistent preferences. This is because, in this numerical example, sophisticates have 45 
% lower critical switching cost and naïfs have 82 % lower critical switching cost than TCs.  
4.2 A DYNAMIC MODEL OF COMPETITION WITH SWITCHING COSTS 
This section analyses the possible implications for the incumbent firm’s pricing 
strategies, when including the different types of consumer behaviour. Consider a simple 
indefinite-period model of a market for a nondurable good where it is the same consumers who 
faces the firms in all the time-periods. There are two types of firms in the market: an incumbent 
monopolist, firm 𝑖, and a number of small competitors, collectively denoted by 𝑓 and called  
fringe firms.14  Ignoring the switching costs, consumers view the fringe firms and the incumbent 
firm as identical. The incumbent offers a product to the price 𝑝𝑡
𝑖. The firm could, but would not, 
set a price which causes the consumers to get negative consumer surplus because that would 
result in zero demand. Firm 𝑖 has market power because it is known in the market and 
consumers incur a switching cost if they are to switch to any of the fringe firms. The incumbent 
firm will strategically adapt itself to the entries of the fringe firms. The fringe firms adapt 
themselves in the market following firm 𝑖’s strategies. The new firms act consequently as price 
takers. For simplicity, assume none of the firms have production costs.  
I assume that the consumers have unit demands and when consuming the product 
offered by the incumbent firm, each consumer receives a surplus from equal to 1 less the price 
𝑝𝑡
𝑖, when paying the price 𝑝𝑡 in period 𝑡. Consumers expect that 𝑖’s price tomorrow will be the 
same as 𝑖’s price today. Implying they believe firm 𝑖 will charge the same price forever, hence 
we can write 𝑝𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖. In the first period of the model, consumers are given an extra choice 
where they can switch to a new small competitor (any fringe firm) of the incumbent firm. It is 
assumed that the consumers incur a one-time cost of switching to any of the fringe firms. The 
consumers are differentiated with respect to their switching cost, 𝑠 = 5𝜃 ≥ 0, where 𝜃 denotes 
the type of consumer. The total mass of consumers is normalized to 1. A consumer of type 𝜃 ∈
[0,1] who switch to a firm 𝑓 pay a switching cost equal to 𝑠 = 5𝜃. 𝜃 is uniformly distributed 
over its range, where the lowest consumer type, 𝜃 = 0, has a switching cost equal to zero, and 
the highest type, 𝜃 = 1, has a switching cost equal to 5. The level of switching cost depends on 
 
14Several small (identical) competitors  to an incumbent firm is also known as a competitive fringe.  
Competitive fringes are a term used to denote small producers who have no market power and who supply output 
competitively in response to whatever market price the dominant firm (here the incumbent firm) chooses to set. 






different reasons (psychological, informational, ability to learn, etc.) and 𝜃  is private 
information to the consumer (so it is difficult for the firm to price discriminate based on the 
switching cost). The period the consumer switch, his/her consumer surplus will be equal to 1 −
𝑝𝑓 − 5𝜃, and in the consecutive periods it will be equal to 1 − 𝑝𝑓.  
Next, since the fringe firms are assumed to be identical, and given that there are no 
switching costs associated with switching away from a fringe firm, it is possible to infer a Nash 
equilibrium exists in which all the fringe firms charge a price equal to their marginal cost. This 
implies that the fringe firms essentially are playing an undifferentiated Bertrand game in every 
period, where they end up in a Bertrand Paradox and set their price equal to zero, denoted: 𝑝𝑓
∗ =
0.  
4.2.1 Demand Function 
In this Subsection, demand functions will be derived based on the framework provided 
by O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999). The consumer types’ plan resembles the equations presented 
in Subsection 4.1, but here the parameters will be defined. 
4.2.1.1 Exponential Discounters 
In Chapter 4.1.1, the expected utilities from switching in the first period or staying 
forever were derived. The same optimization of plan is used here, hence TCs will still not 
choose to switch any later than the first period. Consumers (expected) consumer surplus from 







𝑣𝑖 (15)  
And if the consumer chooses to switch in period 0, the expected utility is: 






𝑣𝑓 − 𝑠 (16)  
The superscript 𝑓 indicates it is the consumer surplus attained at any of the fringe firms. 
We have that 𝑣𝑖 = 1 − 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗 = 1 and 𝑠 = 5𝜃. By inserting these values into the expected 
utility functions, we will have that the expected utility from staying forever at the incumbent 
firm is equal to (1 − 𝑝𝑖)
1
1−𝛿
, and the expected utility from switching in period 0 is equal to 
1
1−𝛿





The incumbent firm would be interested in the consumer who are indifferent between 
staying forever and switching in period 0. By equalizing the two expected utility equations and 












𝑝𝑖 (17)  
Along the interval [0,1], 𝜃𝑇𝐶
∗  distinguish between those consumer types who want to 
switch to a fringe firm (< 𝜃𝑇𝐶
∗ ) and those who stay at the incumbent firm (> 𝜃𝑇𝐶
∗ ). Given that 
the incumbent firm is located at 1 in the interval and set a price less or equal to 1 (if 𝑝𝑖 > 1, no 
consumers would want to purchase the product offered by the incumbent firm), its demand will 
be equal to: 
 𝐷𝑇𝐶(𝑝
𝑖) = 1 −
1
5(1 − 𝛿)
𝑝𝑖 (18)  
4.2.1.2 Hyperbolic Discounters 
Time-inconsistent consumers expected consumer surplus is the same in this section as 
under Chapter 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 for respectively sophisticates and naïfs. The same projection of 
optimal plan is used here. To recapitulate, consumers expected utility from staying all periods 
at the incumbent firm is equal to: 
 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽∑𝛿𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽
𝛿
1 − 𝛿
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 (1 +
𝛽𝛿
1 − 𝛿
) (19)  
The derived utility from switching in period 0 is: 
 𝑣𝑓 − 𝑠 + 𝛽∑𝛿𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
𝑣𝑓 = 𝑣𝑓 (1 +
𝛽𝛿
1 − 𝛿
) − 𝑠 (20)  
And the derived utility from switching in period 1 is: 
 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽𝛿(𝑣𝑓 − 𝑠) + 𝛽∑𝛿𝑡
∞
𝑡=2
𝑣𝑓 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝛽𝛿𝑠 + 𝛽∑𝛿𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
𝑣𝑓 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑓
𝛽𝛿
1 − 𝛿
− 𝛽𝛿𝑠 (21)  
The only modification here is the superscript 𝑓 to indicate it is the consumer surplus 
attained at a fringe firm. Since sophisticates and naïfs have different optimal plans, the demand 
functions for each of those consumer types are derived separately.  
We start the analysis of hyperbolic discounters by deriving the demand function for the 
sophisticates. Sophisticates chooses between switching in the first period or staying forever. 





expected utility from staying forever at the incumbent firm is equal to  
(1 − 𝑝𝑖) (
1−𝛿+𝛽𝛿
1−𝛿
) , and the expected utility from switching in period 0  is equal to  
1−𝛿+𝛽𝛿
1−𝛿
− 5𝜃. By equating these expected utilities, the indifferent consumer can be found when 
solving for 𝜃: 
(1 − 𝑝𝑖) (
1 − 𝛿 + 𝛽𝛿
1 − 𝛿
) =





1 − 𝛿 + 𝛽𝛿
5(1 − 𝛿)
𝑝𝑖 (22)  
Along the interval [0,1], 𝜃𝑆
∗ distinguish between those consumer types who would want 
to switch to a fringe firm (< 𝜃𝑆
∗) and those who stay at the incumbent firm (> 𝜃𝑆
∗). The demand 
for the incumbent firm located at 1 in the interval, is thus: given that 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1 
 𝐷𝑆(𝑝
𝑖) = 1 −
1 − 𝛿 + 𝛽𝛿
5(1 − 𝛿)
𝑝𝑖 (23)  
Next, we derive the demand function for the naïfs. Naïfs optimal plan is to either switch 
in the first period or switch in the next period. The same procedure as under TCs and 








𝛽𝛿5𝜃. The indifferent consumer is found by equating these expected utilities and solving for 
𝜃: 
1 − 𝛿 + 𝛽𝛿
1 − 𝛿
− 5𝜃 =
1 − 𝛿 + 𝛽𝛿
1 − 𝛿





 (24)  
Along the interval [0,1], 𝜃𝑁
∗  distinguish between those consumer types who would want 
to switch to a fringe firm (< 𝜃𝑁
∗ ) and those who stay at the incumbent firm (> 𝜃𝑁
∗ ). The demand 
for the incumbent firm located at 1 in the interval, is thus: given that 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1 
 𝐷𝑁(𝑝
𝑖) = 1 −
𝑝𝑖
5(1 − 𝛽𝛿)
 (25)  
4.2.1.3 Remarks 
The demand functions display less elasticity with hyperbolic discounting compared to 
exponential discounting. In the figures below, naïfs display approximately perfect inelasticity, 
sophisticates display mild inelasticity in Figure 4.3 and elastic demand in Figure 4.4, while TCs 









4.2.2 Profit Maximation 
The incumbent firm’s price is set independently of the competitive fringe and depends 
on the incumbents’ demand which is determined by the consumer surpluses, consumers degree 
of patience, consumers preferences for current consumption, and the switching cost. The 
incumbent firm maximizes its profit with respect to its price. If the incumbent firm (𝑖) enjoys 
monopoly status, it would optimally charge a price, 𝑝𝑀, which cover all the consumer surplus. 
By inserting the demand-functions for the respective consumer types, the optimal market price 
offered by the incumbent firm will be found. However, there might also exist a corner solution 
if the participation constraints for the consumer types is unfulfilled.  
If all the consumers in the market are time-consistent and 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1, the profit function for 
the incumbent firm would be:  
 𝜋𝑇𝐶
𝑖 = (1 −
1
5(1 − 𝛿)
𝑝𝑖) 𝑝𝑖 (26)  
The first-order condition for profit maximized price is found when differentiating this 
profit function with respect to 𝑝𝑖 and equalizing to zero: 
Figure 4.3: Incumbent’s demand for different prices when 
𝛽 = 0.5 and 𝛿 = 0.8 
Figure 4.4: Incumbent’s demand for different prices when 














𝑝𝑖 = 0 
By solving the first-order condition with respect to 𝑝𝑖, it is found that the optimal price 





 (27)  
This is the optimal price only if 𝛿 is sufficiently high, so the expression is below 1.15 
When 𝛿 is too low, the optimal price will instead be 1. The threshold for there to be an interior 
solution for optimal price is found. The participation constraint for the consumers is: 
 1 ≥ 𝑝𝑇𝐶
𝑖 (𝛿) (28)  
Solving for 𝛿, we find that the condition is: 𝛿 ≥
3
5





𝑖 (𝛿) to be the optimal price in the market. If this is the case, the incumbent firm’s demand 
will be: 
𝐷𝑇𝐶












, resulting in a corner solution for the incumbent firm’s price, the incumbent 
firm would set its price equal to 1. The incumbent firm’s demand share under this case would 
be:  
𝐷𝑇𝐶




Next, if all the consumers in the market is sophisticates and given that 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1, the profit 
function for the incumbent firm would be: 
 
𝜋𝑆
𝑖 = (1 −









1 − 𝛿 + 𝛽𝛿
5(1 − 𝛿)
𝑝𝑖 −
1 − 𝛿 + 𝛽𝛿
5(1 − 𝛿)
𝑝𝑖 = 0 
Solving the first-order condition with respect to 𝑝𝑖, the optimal price for the incumbent 
firm to set to sophisticates is:16 
 𝑝𝑆
𝑖 (𝛿, 𝛽) =
5(1 − 𝛿)
2(1 − 𝛿 + 𝛽𝛿)
 (30)  
 
15 The second-order condition for this solution to be a global maximum is fulfilled, see A.1.2.a. 





This is the optimal price only if 𝛿 and/or 𝛽 is sufficiently high, so that the expression is 
below 1. When 𝛿  and/or 𝛽  is too low, the optimal price will instead be 1. Therefore, the 
threshold for there to be an interior solution for optimal price must be found. The participation 
constraint for the consumers is equal to: 
 1 ≥ 𝑝𝑆
𝑖 (𝛿, 𝛽) (31)  
When simplifying with respect to the discount-factors, we have that: 𝛿(3 + 2𝛽) ≥ 3. If 
this inequality is fulfilled, the incumbent firm’s demand share will be:  
𝐷𝑆
𝑖(𝛽, 𝛿) = 1 −
1 − 𝛿 + 𝛽𝛿
5(1 − 𝛿)
5(1 − 𝛿)





If 𝛿(3 + 2𝛽) < 3, resulting in a corner solution for the incumbent firm’s price, the 
incumbent firm would set its price equal to 1. The incumbent firm’s demand share under this 
case would be:  
𝐷𝑆
𝑖 = 1 −




𝑖  has a larger denominator compared to 𝑝𝑆
𝑖 , the price offered to sophisticates 
exceeds the price offered to TCs (if 𝛽 < 1).  
Lastly, if all the consumers in the market is naïfs and given that 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1, the profit 
function for the incumbent firm would be: 
 𝜋𝑁
𝑖 = (1 −
𝑝𝑖
5(1 − 𝛽𝛿)
)𝑝𝑖 (32)  











By solving the first-order condition with respect to 𝑝𝑖 , the optimal price for the 
incumbent firm to set to naïfs is:17 
 𝑝𝑁
𝑖 (𝛿, 𝛽) =
5(1 − 𝛽𝛿)
2
 (33)  
Both 𝑝𝑇𝐶
𝑖  and 𝑝𝑆
𝑖  have a larger denominator and numerator, so the price offered to naïfs 
is far higher than the price offered to sophisticates and TCs. However, this is the optimal price 
only if 𝛿 and/or 𝛽 is sufficiently high, so the expression is below 1. When 𝛿 and/or 𝛽 is too 
low, the optimal price will instead be 1. The threshold for there to be an interior solution for 
optimal price is found. The participation constraint for the consumers is: 
 1 ≥ 𝑝𝑁
𝑖 (𝛿, 𝛽) (34)  
 





When simplifying with respect to the discount-factors, we have that: 𝛽𝛿 ≥
3
5
. If this is 
satisfied, the incumbent firm’s demand share will be:  
𝐷𝑁









However, since the incumbent firm can set the price for naïfs higher, it is most likely 
not fulfilled. Thus, the incumbent would set a price equal to 1 (if 𝛽𝛿 <
3
5
), and its demand share 
would be equal to:   
𝐷𝑁




4.2.2.1 How the optimal price changes with different 𝛿s and 𝛽s 
The more time-consistent and patient the consumers are, the lower is the optimal price 
given by the firm. In other words, the optimal price for the firm to set to time-inconsistent 
consumers is higher than what is offered to TCs. To illustrate this, I have included four figures 
illustrating how the optimal price change with different discount factor values. 
Firstly, 𝛽 is held constant. Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 illustrates that the higher 𝛿, the 
lower is the optimal price which is set in the market for all the consumer types. When holding 
𝛽 constant, sophisticates eventually converge towards TCs. 
 
 










Secondly, 𝛿 is held constant. Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 illustrates that the higher 𝛽, the 
lower is the optimal price for the firms. The optimal price offered to naïfs and sophisticates will 





















4.2.3 Numerical Example 
A simple example introduces the main idea behind introducing consumer types to 
models with switching costs to firms’ maximization problem. In Table 4.1, two numerical 
examples with different discount factors are presented. 
The more patient the consumer is and/or the less customers prefer current consumption, 
i.e., the higher 𝛿 and/or 𝛽, the lower is the optimal price set by the incumbent. Fewer naïfs will 
switch compared to both TCs and Sophisticates (given that the incumbent firm set the price 
equal to 1). Additionally, Table 4.1 shows that, contingent on 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1, it is optimal for the 
incumbent firm to set a price which ensures it get half the market demand. If, however, the 
incumbent firm set the corner solution, resulting to a price equal to 1, they would obtain a higher 
















































































































𝑖 = 1  















𝑖 = 1  


















This chapter provides some supporting evidence from the mobile market for the 
predictions made in the model presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5.1 introduces some insights to 
the market structure of the Norwegian mobile subscription market, where subsection 5.1.1 looks 
at the total turnover in the mobile market for private subscriptions, subsection 5.1.2 looks at the 
market shares, and lastly subsection 5.1.3 looks at the listed prices in the market. Chapter 5.2 
includes results from two questionnaires, where subsection 5.2.1 introduces some sample 
characteristics, subsection 5.2.2 looks at consumers’ preferences, subsection 5.2.3 looks at 
consumers’ perception of the different mobile suppliers, subsection 5.2.4 looks at the 
respondents attentiveness in the market, and lastly subsection 5.2.5 looks at the respondents 
switching behaviour.  
5.1 MARKET STRUCTURE 
The data for this chapter is collected from Nkom and the mobile subscription suppliers’ 
own webpages. Nkom is the Norwegian Communications Authority and they are an executive 
supervisory and administrative authority for services within electronic and postal 
communication in Norway, enforcing market regulations where needed. Nkom also provides 
public statistics and data in their online database ekomstatistikken.  
5.1.1 Profits 
The total turnover for mobile services amounted to almost NOK 18.1 billion in 2019 
(Nkom, 2020). Nkom states that subscription revenues account for an increasingly larger share 
of mobile sales. In 2019, private subscription revenues accounted for almost 79 % of total sales. 
Figure 5.1 shows the combined revenues from private mobile subscription in the Norwegian 













Revenues from Mobile Subscriptions
5 Evidence from the Mobile Market 






5.1.2 Market Shares 
Nkom (2020) states that Telenor served more than 2.7 million mobile subscriptions at 
the end of 2019. This represented approximately 48 % of the total number of mobile 
subscriptions. Telenor has had a slight decrease over time but has still a high market share. 
Telia is the second largest supplier, with a market share of 36 %. Like Telenor, Telia also 
experience some very minor decreases in market share. Ice is a relatively new supplier in the 
market for mobile subscriptions, but have managed to become the third largest supplier, with a 
market share of approximately 10 %. Combined, these three Mobile Network Operators 
(MNO)18 have a market share of 94 %. Figure 5.2 shows the development of number of 
customers to the most popular mobile subscriptions suppliers in the market. The data  for the 
figure is collected from Nkom (2020). 
 
5.1.3 Price  
The different mobile suppliers set similar prices in the market. A remark with respect to 
prices, is that for any subscription Telenor’s listed prices exceeds all the other mobile suppliers. 
Additionally, Telia offers the second most expensive subscriptions. Figure 5.3 graphs the listed 
prices of some of the largest mobile suppliers. The data was collected from the mobile 
subscription suppliers’ own webpages (Telenor, 2019, Talkmore, 2019, Telia, 2019, ice, 2019, 
Fjordkraft, 2019, Chili Mobil, 2019, OneCall, 2019). Even though Talkmore and OneCall are 
appointed as respectively Telenor’s and Telia’s cheaper brands, they still set higher prices than 
ice and the other mobile suppliers who are depicted in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
18 In Norway, Telenor and Telia are the only MNOs with national coverage, while ice, the last MNO, only 
have partial coverage and borrows the rest from Telia. 
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Since Telenor has the highest share of consumers, the price differences between Telenor 
and the other mobile suppliers are highlighted. Table 5.1 lists the price differences. The prices 
were collected from the mobile subscription suppliers own webpage (Telenor, 2019, Talkmore, 
2019, Telia, 2019, ice, 2019, Fjordkraft, 2019, Chili Mobil, 2019, OneCall, 2019). Telenor’s 
listed prices for subscriptions with monthly payments are 20 to 200 NOK more expensive than 
all the other mobile suppliers.  
Table 5.1: Overview of (listed) price differences between Telenor and other mobile suppliers. The cells show the 
difference in price between Telenor and other providers of mobile subscription for given offered GB subscriptions.  
 
 GB Data 
 
 







Talkmore 50  70  50  50   100 
OneCall 70  80 80       
ice 120 50  100 100 100 100  150  
Fjordkraft 90  70 80 60  60    
Chili 120 100  120  150  200   
Telia   20 20 20 20 20   120 
5.2 RESULTS FROM QUESTIONNAIRES 
The results presented in this chapter is from a survey performed in 2018 and a short 
online survey performed in connection to the thesis in 2020. The surveys collected information 
about the respondent’s choice, attention and switching behaviour in the market for Norwegian 
mobile subscriptions. The last survey had also added a couple questions that were meant to give 





a slight insight into consumers potential self-control problems and time discounting of future 
utility.  
The questionnaire from 2018 was performed in connection to a practice-based course 
offered at the Institute of Economics at the University of Bergen. The survey was made in 
cooperation with the Norwegian Competition Authority and implemented to investigate if ice 
was a sufficient competitor to the other MNOs in the Norwegian mobile market. We performed 
the questionnaire face-to-face at Bergen train station and published it online at our private 
Facebook accounts in September 2018. The results in this chapter consist of a combined sample 
(both face-to-face and internet-based replies) of 579 replies from the 2018-survey.19 
The questionnaire performed in connection to the master thesis this year was internet-
based. It was published on my private Facebook account in Mars and consists of 177 replies. 
The questionnaires included both open and closed questions. Questions that has price answers 
are open answers, allowing the respondents to enter their answers themselves. All the other 
questions either had rating scales or a set of closed quantity categories since it is easier to 
process such answers.20 
The collected data from both questionnaires is processed using Power Query in Excel, 
and the figures are made by using Power Pivot. In the following Subsections, only English 
translations of the asked questions are mentioned. The surveys are meant to be a support (or 
disclaimer) to the main theoretical analysis of the thesis.  
5.2.1 Supplier of Mobile Subscription 
The first question in both surveys was “Which corporation provides your mobile 
subscription?”. The sample from the survey performed in 2018 consisted of customers from 12 
mobile subscriptions suppliers, while the sample from the survey performed in 2020 consisted 
of customers from 10 mobile subscriptions suppliers. In both samples, most respondents have 
mobile subscriptions from the two largest mobile suppliers. In Figure 5.4 the two largest 
suppliers have collectively 68 % and 67 % customers from the subject pool in respectively the 
2018- and 2020-survey. 
 
19 A copy of the 2018-survey in Norwegian can be found in Appendix A.2.1. 





        
 
Since four of the mobile suppliers (Phonero, OneCall, Talkmore, and Dipper) are 
subsidiary companies to either Telia or Telenor, the two MNOs have in fact a higher share of 
customers. In Figure 5.5 the subsidiary companies are added under the parent company. For the 
2020 sample, the two MNOs shares 87 % of the sample. The survey performed in 2018, the 
sample was more representative. Telenor had a larger share of the market. However, Telia and 
ice have acquired several mobile suppliers since 2018.21 
 
 
5.2.2 Consumers’ Preferences 
The following results are meant to say something about consumers preferences in the 
mobile market, indicating how much attention they devote, and how often they switch mobile 
supplier or subscription. If the respondents payed for their own mobile subscription, they were 
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(2020)
Figure 5.4:”Which corporation provides your mobile subscription?” 





asked: “What features did you find important when you last choose a mobile subscription?”. If 
the respondents did not pay for their own mobile subscription, they were asked: “What features 
would you find important when choosing a mobile subscription?”. The results from these 
questions were combined and are illustrated in Figure 5.6. In this figure the subsidiary 
companies are added under the parent companies.22 
Features the respondents might deem important when choosing a mobile subscription can be an 
indicator of mobile subscriptions substitutability and how much attention the consumers devote 
when making their choice. Most customers find price, network speed, and coverage very 
important or important. Customer service is of mixed importance, and brand name is mostly 
not important.  
That the respondends do not find brand name important is a bit unlikely, since brand 
name does often have a signaling value. There exist only three MNOs in the Norwegian Mobile 
Market and consumers do often perceive subscriptions offered by them better than subscriptions 
 
22 The same figure depicting respondents’ preferences by all mobile suppliers can be found in Appendix 
figure 8. 
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offered by MVNOs or VNOs23. Additionally, Telenor are regulated by Nkom, where it is 
required to offer mobile network at a reasonable price and quality to all the MVNOs and VNOs 
in the market. Thus, if brand name does not matter, then all the mobile suppliers should be 
viewed as almost identical. This does not seem to be the consumers thoughs, since Telenor and 
Telia has a substantial higher market share. 
5.2.3 Consumers’ Perception 
Next, the respondents were asked: “In what degree do you agree with the following 
statements? A) My mobile subscription provider provides the best mobile subscription. B) My 
mobile subscription provider is the leader in new technology”. The answers are illustrated 
respectively in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8. The daughter companies of Telia and Telenor are 
merged with the parent company in the figures.  
Figure 5.7 shows similar figures for Telia and Telenor. Most of the respondent’s choose 
the neutral answer. 30 % of both Telia’s and Telenor’s customers (either direct customers or 
through the daughter companies) opt that their supplier offer the best subscription in the mobile 
market.  
 
Figure 5.8 shows that most respondents opt the neutral answer. No one of ice’s 
customers perceive ice’s technology as superior, while Telenor has the most customers who 
perceive their supplier’s technology is the best. 
 
23 Mobile subscription suppliers without their own mobile network, thereby Mobile Virtual Network 
Operators or Virtual Network Operators. MVNOs and VNOs borrow Mobile Network from either Telenor or Telia 










Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Do not know
Best Mobile Subscription (2020) Telia Telenor ice Other
Figure 5.7: The degree of agreement of the statement:  






The next figure is from the survey performed in 2018, where we asked the respondents 
“Who has the best network coverage?” with the choices being Telenor, Telia, Ice, Everyone has 
the same coverage, and I do not know. Figure 5.9 illustrates the respondents’ answers. 52 % of 
the sample believe Telenor offers the best network coverage, 9 % that Telia offers the best, 2 
% that it is ice, 8 % that it is equal coverage and 29 % opted the “do not know”-option. Similar 
results can be found online when looking at consumers perception of the supplier’s network 
coverage (Bytt.no, 2020). However, all three MNO offers national coverage (either in their own 
or borrowed through another). 
 
5.2.4 Consumers’ Attentiveness  
Figure 5.10 shows the results from the question: “How often do you check the prices of 
other subscription providers than your current provider?” combined with what the respondents 
answered with respect to the degree of importance towards the mobile subscriptions’ price. As 
before, daughter companies are merged with the parent company in the figure. 78 % of the 
subjects who found price to be very important or important, but only 12 % of the subjects check 
the prices offered in the market every year or more. 44 % of the respondents do never check the 
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Telenor Telia ice Same Coverage Do not know
Best Network Coverage (2018) Telia Telenor ice Other
Figure 5.8: The degree of agreement of the statement:  
“My mobile subscription provider is the leader in new technology” 
 





“Other” checks prices more often compared to respondents with subscriptions at Telia or 
Telenor.  
 
The respondents were also asked: “How much is the most you think you could save per 
month if you changed to a different mobile subscription?”. Figure 5.11 depicts the monthly 
amount the self-paying respondents expects to save by switching mobile supplier. Of those that 
pay for their own mobile subscription, 70 % answered an estimated amount saved by switching. 
The answers varied in the interval 0 to 300, with the median reply being 49. The average amount 
expected saved was 51, and most respondents thought they would not save anything (or 
marginally).  
 
Figure 5.12 depicts the estimated (rounded)  percentage saved per month. The figure 
was made by subtracting the expected amount saved per month to reported monthly price for 
the subscription (the answer to “What is the price for your mobile subscription?”). The 
estimated percentage saved varies from 0 to 44 % of reported price, with the median reply being 
14 %. The average expected percentage saved is 14 %. 36 % of those who expect to save 
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Figure 5.10: Frequency of checking prices and importance of price 






5.2.5 Switching Behaviour 
To shed some light into the respondents’ switching behaviour, they were asked: “How 
often do you change supplier of mobile subscriptions?”. Figure 5.13 depicts the respondent’s 
answers. In general, it seems like people tend to have the same mobile supplier over a longer 
time-period. 30 % of the sample have never switched, 57 % switches less than every other year, 
and 13 % switches more often. Telenor has the largest share of subjects who never switch. 
 
Next, we asked: “How often do you change mobile subscriptions?”. Figure 5.14 depicts 
the respondent’s mobile subscription switching frequency by mobile supplier. 49 % switch 
mobile subscription less than every other year, 23 % never switch, and 28 % switches more 
often than every other year. The respondents switch subscriptions more often than suppliers.  
22
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Figure 5.12: Estimated monthly percentage saved of reported price (2020) 
 






The respondents were also asked: “When did you last change supplier of mobile 
subscription?”. Figure 5.15 depicts the answers, but a mistake occurred in the online version of 
this question, where the option between one and two years was not included, so the answers is 
possibly biased. The figure shows that 29 % of the sample has switched within two years. 15 
% have never switched suppliers. When estimating the average of the replies, by denoting less 
than a half year, between a half year and one year, over 2 years, and never respectively 1, 2, 3, 
and 4. It is found that the average number is 2,8. This implies the average reply for when 
consumer last switched suppliers is over 2 years. Telenor has the largest share of subjects who 
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Telia OneCall Phonero Telenor Talkmore ice Chili mobil Fjordkraft Mobil
Figure 5.14: How often the respondents switch mobile subscriptions 






Moreover, the respondents were asked: “How long do you expect it will be before you 
switch the next time?”. Figure 5.16 shows the answers (the same mistake as the previous 
question occurred in this question). 32 % of the subjects estimates they will switch within two 
years, and 12 % believe they will never switch suppliers. Following the same strategy as 
mentioned above, the average answer for predicted next switch is found. The average number 
is 2.5, so most subjects expect it will be over 2 years till the next switch.  
 
In the questionnaire performed in 2018, we asked the respondents to what degree of 
easiness they found switching suppliers and when they last switched mobile suppliers. Figure 
5.17 shows the respondents perception of easiness of switching mobile suppliers separated for 
those who have switched suppliers and those who never have. The average reply for 
respondents who  have switched is 4.1, indicating consumers find it rather easy to switch 
suppliers of mobile subscriptions. The average reply for respondents who have not switched is 
also 4.1. Combined, 37 % find switching very easy, 37 % rather easy, 14 % neither hard nor 
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1 - Very Hard
2 - Rather Hard
3 - Neither Hard nor Easy
4 - Rather Easy
5 - Very Easy
Do not know
Perception of Switching Supplier (2018)
Have never switched Have previously switched
Figure 5.16: Overview of when the respondents predict to switch next. 
 






Figure 5.18 depicts the respondents’ perception of difficultness of switching mobile 
suppliers combined with how long since they last switched. 25 % of the sample have switched 
within the last year, 46 % switched for more than a year since and 26 % had never switched. 
Those who have switched within the year, find on average that the easiness of switching 
suppliers is 4,21. For those who switched for more than a year ago, the average reply of easiness 
of switching suppliers is 4,06. Lastly, those who have never switched find the easiness of 
switching suppliers on average to be 4,22. 
 
In the 2018-questionnaire, the respondents were also asked which mobile suppliers they 
had before they switched. Figure 5.19 depicts which mobile supplier respondents had last (on 
y-axis) and who they have switched to (column). Most of the subjects switched to either 
Telenor, Telia or ice. 33 % of those who have switched, switched to Telenor, 23 % to Telia. 18 
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Figure 5.18: Perception of easiness of switching suppliers combined with duration since the respondents last switched 
suppliers 
 





The respondents of the 2018-survey were also asked which mobile supplier they would 
switch to if their current mobile supplier stopped offering mobile subscriptions. Figure 5.20 
depicts the answers sorted by the respondents’ current mobile subscription. 40 % of the subjects 
would switch to Telenor, 26 % to Telia, 11 % to ice, 7 % to OneCall, 6 % to Talkmore, and the 
restoring 10 % to various other suppliers. 63 % of subjects who have Telenor would switch to 
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The discussion is separated into two chapters. Chapter 6.1 discuss the implications of 
the derived model, where subsection 6.1.1 highlights the thesis’ attribution to the current 
literature, and subsection 6.1.2 mentions some policy implications if it is hyperbolic discounting 
which drives the switching cost puzzle. Chapter 6.2 discuss the validity of the model, where we 
in subsection 6.2.1 discuss how applicable the predictions of the model is to the mobile market, 
subsection 6.2.2 discuss the assumptions of the model, and lastly subsection 6.2.3 discuss other 
potential solutions to the switching cost puzzle.  
6.1 IMPLICATIONS OF THE DERIVED MODEL 
I have studied a model of competition in which, because of different discount factors, 
some consumers become more “locked-in” to their current supplier. It was found that the 
incumbent firm in the market would strategically adapt itself to the entries of the competitive 
fringe and exploit some of its locked-in consumers. Naïveté resulted in a larger incumbent price 
compared to time-consistency, while sophistication lead to a price in between the two 
“extremes”. The incumbent firm choose to serve the customers with a relatively higher 
switching cost and let the consumers with low switching costs switch to a fringe firm.  
6.1.1 Contribution to the Literature 
This thesis contributes to the literature on the market interaction between time-
consistent and -inconsistent consumers and the literature for switching costs implications on 
market outcomes. There exist a range of articles for each of the mentioned literatures, but as far 
as the author of this thesis know, there currently only exist one article combining those literature 
strands, namely the article by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004). 
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) focus on how firms have incentives to increase its 
switching cost to naïve consumers as to set a higher price. This thesis argument that even a low 
switching cost can be deterring for naïve consumers (although fully naïve and for a different 
market setting), so incumbent firms can just increase their prices without the need of increasing 
its switching costs.  
 Klemperer (1987) states that switching costs make demand more inelastic. In the derived 
model in this thesis, the added consumer types to the problem made the demand more inelastic 






biasedness and are unaware of this self-control problem, a great share of the demand will in 
fact have perfectly inelastic demand in the model. 
6.1.2 Policies to Increase Switching 
If cognitive limitations are the root of the problem, behavioural economics argues that 
there may exist simpler and more cost-effective tools to address the problem rather than using 
tax incentives or bans. Behavioural interventions are interventions which help people 
implement their “true” preferences and/or interventions that revaluates the cost-benefit analysis 
for the consumer (Weimer, 2020). You can try to make people act according to their true 
preferences by, e.g., providing decision aids, planning aids, feedback, reminders, active choice, 
simplification, or commitment devices. To change the cost-benefit analysis, you could change 
the default options (if they serve as reference points), anchoring (the first “valuation” that 
people are exposed to), social information (social comparisons), or framing.   
If even small switching costs can deter consumers to not switch, then competition 
authorities’ goal for increasing switching frequency should be focused on changing consumer 
behaviour (in addition to decreasing the switching costs). It would be possible for the 
government (Nkom) to implement a nudge policy to increase the switching frequency. This 
implies the regulator influence consumers’ choices in a way that will make the consumer better 
off by his/her own judgement (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). This is also supported by DellaVigna 
and Malmendier (2004), who recommends the best policy is to educate naïve consumers as far 
as possible regarding their lack of self-awareness. Furthermore, Wilkinson and Klaes (2018) 
argue that there is a role for a paternalistic government to intervene in situations where 
consumers are not able to maximize their welfare, if it can obtain more information regarding 
the future preferences of these consumers than the consumers themselves.  
Allcott and Rogers (2014) studied the impact of a nudge for reducing electricity 
consumption in households by providing feedbacks with social comparison. They found strong 
effects in the short-run where recipients of the reports improved, reducing their consumption 
levels. There was not a huge effect in the long-run. However, the nudge was a relatively small 
and cheap signal. Allcott and Rogers (2014) found indications of adjustments in the nudge-
recipients’ behaviour. They argued that the social comparison is an important driver for those 
who reduced their consumption level and found sustained behavioural change over time 
(although in a lower effect than in the short-run). I.e., the consumers got more self-aware and 





A similar nudge as the one Allcott and Rogers (2014) studied could be easily 
implemented in the mobile subscription market. Since much indicates that people react to social 
comparisons, statements like; “You are currently paying 𝑋  per month for your mobile 
subscription. This is more than what the average consumer are paying for an equivalent 
subscription. You could achieve 𝑌 per month if you switch.”, would potentially increase some 
naïve consumers self-awareness. Reme et al. (2018) analysed some Norwegian mobile 
subscription consumers’ behaviour after a “poke” was implemented due to changed mobile 
subscription and found that more customers switched after receiving the “poke”.  
Lastly, it might be interesting to mention that soon the mobile subscription market will 
have e-SIM, making switching mobile suppliers even easier (Jansen, 2019). Thus, any physical 
switching costs should be marginal.  
6.2 VALIDITY OF THE MODEL 
In this section, I argue that the predictions made in the model presented in this thesis are 
partially supported by what is observed in the mobile subscription market. However, there 
might exist other reasons than procrastination among naïve consumers which “creates” the 
switching cost puzzle. 
6.2.1 Applicability  
There is some partial evidence from the mobile market which supports the model 
presented in this thesis. Most respondents (in both surveys) had subscriptions at Telenor or 
Telia, the two most expensive mobile suppliers in the mobile market. Although all the mobile 
suppliers’ services are as good as identical, much suggests that consumers do not view them as 
homogeneous.  
The respondents perceived it to be easy to switch mobile suppliers, yet the average 
respondent does not switch suppliers within two years. Some respondents expect a major cost-
reduction if they switch. Nevertheless, most of the respondents expect to save nothing or 
marginal by switching supplier of mobile subscription. As mentioned, over a third of those who 
expect to save nothing have subscriptions at Telia. One would expect they would in fact save a 





The respondents of the 2020-survey were 
also asked: “In the past month, have you delayed any 
activity which could have been better done earlier?”, 
which 63 % admitted they had (see Figure 6.1). 
Figure 6.2 combine this question with how long 
since the participants last switched mobile suppliers. 
It is observed that a major part of those who 
reported they have never switched consists of 
those who have procrastinated. Additionally, Figure 6.3 combined the answers from the 
procrastination question with respondents predicted next switch of mobile suppliers.  
 
 
 The respondents of the 2020-survey were additionally asked: “If you could choose 
between receiving a payment of 100NOK now or a certain amount X in 4 weeks, what would 
be the lowest amount of X for which you would choose the later payment?”. The average of the 
answers was 321NOK. Excluding the extreme answers (less than 100NOK, more than 
1000NOK), the average of the answers is 293NOK. Most of the respondents answered 200NOK 
in one month would be equally as good as 100NOK today. The respondent’s answers are 
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Figure 6.2: “In the past month, have you delayed any activity which would have been better done earlier?“ combined with 
“When did you last change supplier of mobile subscription?” 
Figure 6.3: “In the past month, have you delayed any activity which would have been better done earlier?“ combined with 










Figure 6.1: “In the past month, have you delayed any 







If the questionnaire were to be performed once again, a better implementation would be 
to add “Thaler (1999) questions” to shed some insight into the respondent’s consumer types. 
Additionally, more questions regarding procrastination would be needed to say something 
concrete about the respondent’s procrastination habits. Adding such questions would shed 
better light on the applicability of the model.  
6.2.2 The Model Assumptions 
The model’s validity is partially critical on the fact that the switching costs mainly 
consist of what is observable, i.e. physical costs, and not a substantial psychological cost. Most 
of the other assumptions which is made can be viewed as standard in economic models. The 
predictions of the model would most likely persist (though perhaps to a lower degree) if the 
assumptions were weakened.  
The model presented in the thesis presents an extreme version of rationality, and since 
consumers expectations stay the same for the infinite time-periods, the model would probably 
not be realistic when allowing for new customers to enter in later periods. Even though it is a 
highly abstract model, it shed light on mechanisms which can be thought of as playing a role 
when consumers decide whether to switch to other firms in a basic and straightforward way. 
Additionally, most of the economic models are abstractions from reality because they e.g. build 
on several, often unrealistic, assumptions, but the simplicity of abstract models makes them 
attractive for describing complex economic phenomena. 
It is the naïfs which drives the most extreme results, and in the model, they fall for the 
same error forever. This is a rather extreme behaviour, i.e., the assumptions that parameters and 
the type of consumers are static over time is rather strong. It is doubtful that consumers would 
fall for the same mistake forever, but one could expect a quite large postponing period where a 
certain consumer type is stuck at more expensive firms. Additionally, O'Donoghue and Rabin 
(2001) argue consumers are likely to procrastinate activities over long time-horizons due to 

























































Figure 6.4: : “If you could choose between receiving a payment of 100NOK now or a certain amount X in 4 weeks, what 





constantly shifting preferences, i.e., the consumers changes their options over time and thus 
continuously delay finishing the activity.  
To lessen the extreme assumption of naïveté, one could include partially naïve 
consumers. This would present a weaker assumption for consumer behaviour, and would result 
in less extreme result, but partially naïfs would still have a stronger present biasedness 
compared to sophisticates. This indicates there would nevertheless be quite strong results in 
line with what is presented in this thesis. Additionally, if allowing for consumers to change 
behaviour, they could suddenly change to be sophisticates. Nevertheless, firms can also set the 
prices higher for sophisticates compared to TCs.  
If the model opened new customers entering in later periods, firms could have incentives 
to offer discounts to new customers. However, if customers can pretend that they are new or if 
the good can be resold, it would be impossible to separate new and old customers. Additionally, 
if consumers know the discount is only temporary, it is not sure it would work as an inducement 
to encourage switching. Firms who compete over a longer time-horizon, can also often manage 
to set a price higher than the marginal cost via tacit collusion. How easily firms manage to 
coordinate their prices depends on the market structure among other things, but it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to discuss this. Lastly, if some consumers switch, firms could want to get 
them back by setting a (personal) lower price. 
Some interesting issues lie beyond the scope of this thesis. It would be interesting to 
extend this framework to firms who are more symmetric and introduce teaser-rates. Then the 
implications of naïveté and sophistication could be analysed in a more realistic framework. 
Also, it would be interesting to analyse how the incumbent firm would strategically adapt itself 
in a model which consist of all the consumer types and where it does not know how large share 
that are naïve, sophisticated or TC.  
6.2.3 Other Solutions to the Switching Cost Puzzle 
The switching cost puzzle could potentially be explained by unobservable psychological 
switching costs. This could for example stem from a high degree of brand loyalty. However, 
this would imply the result from the 2018-survey indicating respondents perceive switching to 
be easy and the result from the 2020-survey which indicates brand name is of little importance 
are inaccurate. 
Another explanation behind the switching cost puzzle could be that consumers exhibit 





resembles what O'Donoghue and Rabin (2001) study, and would perhaps also imply consumers 
are in fact procrastinating switching suppliers. 
Lastly, a potential behavioural bias which might be the root cause of the switching cost 
is inertia. Reme et al. (2018) studies consumers’ inertia in the mobile subscription market, 
focusing on the decision of whether to switch to a competing provider. Inertia is driven by 
frictions in consumer choice. They find “that the propensity to switch provider after [a] price 
change increases among consumers whose costs decrease with the new prices[…] [and that] 
the increase is largest right after consumers are informed of the upcoming change as opposed 





The thesis provides one potential explanation for the existence of markets where a few 
high price suppliers hold the bulk of the market share, yet consumer switching cost barriers 
appear small. A naïve hyperbolic discounting consumer misinterprets his/her own future 
discounting process, leading him/her to procrastinate switching suppliers. This would allow for 
dominant incumbent firms to maintain a price in the market without losing much market share. 
Furthermore, the switching cost level needed to deter a naïve consumer from switching is in 
this model often much lower than the level needed to deter more rational consumer.  
 
  






A.1 MODEL - CALCULATIONS 
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A.1.2 Second-Order Condition  
A.1.2.a TCs 
The second-order condition for profit maximized price is found by second 
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1)    Hvilket selskap har du mobilabonnement (tale, SMS, data) hos i dag? 
□___________________________ 
□ Vet ikke – (Avslutt) 
 
2)    Hvilken type mobilabonnement har du? 
□ Kontantkort 
□ Abonnement/månedlig betaling 
□ Annet ____________________ (Avslutt) 
□ Vet ikke (Avslutt) 
 
3)    Betaler du for ditt mobilabonnement selv? 
□ Ja – jeg betaler selv 








□ Andre: _________________ 
□ Vet ikke (Avslutt) 
□ Vet ikke (Avslutt) 
 
4)    Valgte du selv dette mobilabonnementet eller valgte noen andre dette for deg? 
□ Ja – jeg valgte dette selv (5A) 
□ Nei – noen andre valgte dette for meg (5B) 
□ Vet ikke (5B) 
 
5A) Hva var viktigst for deg da du valgte din nåværende leverandør av mobiltelefonitjenester? 
(Velg én) 5B) Hva hadde vært viktigst for deg hvis du selv skulle valgt leverandør av 
mobiltelefonitjenester? (Velg én) 
□ Pris på mobiltjenestene (ringeminutter, SMS og mengde data) 
□ Nettverksdekning 
□ Nettverkshastighet 
□ Kvalitet på kundeservice 
□ Utvalg av mobiltelefoner og kvalitet på disse 
□ Merkevarenavn 
□ Annet_________________  
□ Pris på mobiltjenestene (ringeminutter, SMS og mengde data) 
□ Nettverksdekning 
□ Nettverkshastighet 
□ Kvalitet på kundeservice 




6)    Omtrent hvor mye koster ditt mobilabonnement (og/eller kontantkort) per måned? 
□ _____________ NOK til mobilabonnement 
□ _____________ NOK til kontantkort 
□ Vet ikke 
 
7)    Hvor mange GB datatrafikk har du inkludert i mobilabonnementet ditt? 
□ _____________________ 
□ Ingen 
□ Vet ikke 
 
8)    Hvilke av disse leverandørene av mobilabonnement kjenner du til? Svar: ja eller nei.   
□ Chili Mobil 
□ Fjordkraft Mobil 
□ Get Mobil 
□ Ice 















□ Andre: __________________________  
 
9) Anta at din leverandør ikke lenger tilbyr mobilabonnement, slik at du må foreta et annet valg.  
Hva ville du mest sannsynlig ha gjort?  
□ Jeg ville valgt en annen leverandør av mobilabonnement  
Hvilken leverandør ville du mest sannsynlig ha valgt? 
□ Leverandør: ______________________ 
□ Vet ikke  
□ Annet: ____________________ 
□ Vet ikke 
 
10) Når byttet du sist leverandør av mobilabonnement? 
□ For mindre enn 6 måneder siden (11A, 12A) 
□ For 6-12 måneder siden (11A, 12A) 
□ For mer enn 12 måneder siden (11A, 12A) 
□ Har aldri byttet leverandør av mobilabonnement (11B, 12B) 
□ Vet ikke (12B) 
 
11A i) 
Du har byttet leverandør av mobilabonnement. Hvem var din forrige leverandør? 11B) 
Du har aldri byttet leverandør av mobilabonnement. Hva er/tror du er årsaken til dette? (Velg 
én) 
□ ___________________________ 
□ Vet ikke 
 
11A ii) 
Var det en selger som gjorde at du byttet, eller gjorde du byttet selv? 
□ Selger 
□ Meg selv 
□ Vet ikke  
□ Jeg er fornøyd med nåværende leverandør 
□ Jeg vet ikke hvordan man bytter leverandør 
□ Jeg har ikke satt meg inn i hva andre leverandører kan tilby 
□ Annet: _______________________________ 
□ Vet ikke 
 
12 A) På en skala fra 1-5, hvor lett eller vanskelig synes du det er å bytte leverandør av 
mobilabonnement, der 1 er svært vanskelig og 5 er svært lett? 12 B) På en skala fra 1-5, 
hvor lett eller vanskelig tror du det er å bytte leverandør av mobilabonnement, der 1 er svært 
vanskelig og 5 er svært lett? 
□ 1 – Svært vanskelig 
□ 2 – Ganske vanskelig 
□ 3 –Verken vanskelig eller lett 





□ 5 – Svært lett 
□ Vet ikke  
□ 1 – Svært vanskelig 
□ 2 – Ganske vanskelig 
□ 3 – Verken vanskelig eller lett 
□ 4 – Ganske lett 
□ 5 – Svært lett 
□ Vet ikke 
 




□ Alle har like god dekning 
□ Vet ikke 
 
14) Hva er din alder? 
□ Under 18 år 
□ 18-29 år 
□ 30-39 år 
□ 40-49 år 
□ 50-59 år 
□ 60+ år 
□ Vil ikke svare 
 





16) Hva er din høyeste fullførte utdannelse? 
□ Ungdomsskole 
□ Videregående skole 
□ Høyskole/universitet (1-3 år) 
□ Høyskole/universitet (Mer enn 3 år) 

















































A.2.3 Additional results 
 
Appendix figure 1: Gender distribution 
 



































Appendix figure 3: Educational distribution 
 
 
Appendix figure 4: Education and mobile supplier 
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Appendix figure 6: Payer of subscription and mobile supplier 
 
Appendix figure 7: “If you could choose between receiving a payment of 100NOK now or a certain amount X in 4 weeks, 
















Atea Chili mobil Fjordkraft
Mobil
Dipper Talkmore OneCall Phonero ice Telia Telenor
Payer of Mobile Subscription (2020)
Firm I Parents Spouse




















Appendix figure 8:” What features did you find important when you last choose a mobile subscription?” or “What features 
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Appendix figure 9: Perceived best network coverage by all mobile suppliers 
 
 
Appendix figure 10: Participants’ age combined with “How often do you change supplier of mobile subscriptions?” 
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Appendix figure 11: “When did you last change supplier of mobile subscription?” by all mobile suppliers.  
 
 
Appendix figure 12: “In the past month, have you delayed any activity which would have been better done earlier?” by 
mobile supplier. 























































































































A.3 THE MOBILE MARKET 
A.3.1 Listed Prices  
Appendix Table 1: Overview of price and GB offered by different providers in the mobile market.  
GB data Chili Fjordkraft ice OneCall Talkmore Telenor Telia 
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